Milcraft

Makers of Modern Strategy (Peter Paret et al., Editor)

Table of Contents

Copy Doctrine

Practice 1: Build military power on reliable public institutions

Problem
Mercenary forces often place private gain above public security.

Action
Build disciplined citizen forces under firm political control.

Outcome
The state gains military power that better serves its interests.

Chapter: The Origins of Modern War - Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War

Practice 2: Combine disciplined units with different strengths

Problem
Independent units cannot respond well to every battlefield threat.

Action
Train infantry, cavalry, and artillery to act together under clear commands.

Outcome
The force can apply coordinated power across changing conditions.

Chapter: The Origins of Modern War - Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the "Military Revolution" of the Seventeenth Century

Practice 3: Apply technical knowledge to defensive design

Problem
Defenses fail when their design ignores advances in weapons and engineering.

Action
Use measurement, geometry, and field testing to improve fortifications.

Outcome
Defensive positions become harder to attack and easier to support.

Chapter: The Origins of Modern War - Vauban: The Impact of Science on War

Practice 4: Match military organization to political change

Problem
Dynastic armies become inadequate when war begins to involve whole nations.

Action
Connect military service, public resources, and national political aims.

Outcome
The state can mobilize greater strength for wider conflicts.

Chapter: The Origins of Modern War - Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War

Practice 5: Concentrate force and move before the enemy can react

Problem
Slow and divided armies allow the enemy to prepare and combine its forces.

Action
Concentrate superior strength at the decisive place with rapid movement.

Outcome
The enemy must fight under unfavorable conditions.

Chapter: The Expansion of War - Napoleon and the Revolution in War

Practice 6: Direct strength toward the decisive point

Problem
Scattered operations waste strength on objectives that cannot decide the conflict.

Action
Identify the decisive point and concentrate the main effort there.

Outcome
Military action produces a greater effect with the available force.

Chapter: The Expansion of War - Jomini

Practice 7: Make military action serve a political purpose

Problem
Military success has little value when it does not support the political goal.

Action
Choose military aims according to the desired political result.

Outcome
Operations remain connected to the reason for fighting.

Chapter: The Expansion of War - Clausewitz

Practice 8: Build economic strength before relying on military strength

Problem
Armed forces cannot endure without production, trade, finance, and transport.

Action
Develop the economic base needed to supply and sustain national defense.

Outcome
The state can support military action for the required duration.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power

Practice 9: Examine how social conflict shapes armed forces

Problem
An army cannot remain separate from the economic and social order around it.

Action
Assess how class interests and political tensions affect military loyalty.

Outcome
Leaders can better anticipate unrest, revolution, and changes in military behavior.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society

Practice 10: Prepare commanders through a permanent planning staff

Problem
Modern armies impose planning demands that no single commander can manage alone.

Action
Maintain a trained staff that studies options and prepares coordinated plans.

Outcome
Commanders receive timely support for complex operations.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff

Practice 11: Use envelopment only when movement can be sustained

Problem
A wide turning movement can fail when distance and resistance disrupt coordination.

Action
Test every plan of envelopment against time, logistics, terrain, and enemy action.

Outcome
The maneuver has a better chance of surrounding the enemy without weakening itself.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment

Practice 12: Test strategic claims against historical evidence

Problem
Military theories become misleading when they rely on selected examples.

Action
Compare strategic claims with the full political and military record.

Outcome
Doctrine rests on stronger evidence and clearer limits.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Delbrück: The Military Historian

Practice 13: Adapt foreign military ideas to local conditions

Problem
Imported doctrine may not fit a country's geography, institutions, or military culture.

Action
Combine useful foreign methods with proven national practices.

Outcome
The armed forces gain modern methods without losing local effectiveness.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov

Practice 14: Join security measures with legitimate local government

Problem
Force alone cannot create lasting control among a resistant population.

Action
Pair limited military action with fair administration and local cooperation.

Outcome
Violence declines as public acceptance of authority grows.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare

Practice 15: Align national strategy with geography and resources

Problem
Strategic ambitions fail when they exceed the country's position and available strength.

Action
Set military commitments according to geography, resources, and political aims.

Outcome
National power supports achievable objectives.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War

Practice 16: Secure sea access for national power

Problem
A maritime state loses influence when enemies can block its trade and movement.

Action
Concentrate naval strength where it can control vital sea routes.

Outcome
The state can protect commerce and move forces across oceans.

Chapter: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War - Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian

Practice 17: Keep political leaders responsible for strategy

Problem
Military plans can pursue battlefield success while neglecting national priorities.

Action
Require political leaders to set objectives and judge major military choices.

Outcome
The use of force remains accountable to national policy.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - The Political Leader as Strategist

Practice 18: Test offensive doctrine against actual firepower

Problem
Confidence in attack becomes deadly when weapons favor prepared defenders.

Action
Base offensive plans on realistic evidence about firepower and losses.

Outcome
Commanders avoid attacks that cost lives without gaining useful results.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914

Practice 19: Integrate machines without neglecting political limits

Problem
Fast operational victories cannot rescue a war built on impossible political aims.

Action
Combine mobile forces with a strategy that matches resources and political goals.

Outcome
Military effectiveness supports a sustainable war effort.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945

Practice 20: Use mobile forces to preserve strategic choice

Problem
Static defense and unlimited commitments reduce freedom of action.

Action
Use mechanized reserves to counter threats while limiting unnecessary commitments.

Outcome
The state can defend vital interests without exhausting its strength.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense

Practice 21: Judge air power by achievable effects

Problem
Claims that bombing alone can decide war often exceed operational reality.

Action
Match air missions to tested capabilities and specific strategic goals.

Outcome
Air power produces useful effects without carrying impossible expectations.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists

Practice 22: Prepare defense across the full depth of the state

Problem
A powerful first attack can break forces that lack reserves and industrial support.

Action
Organize layered operations with reserves, production, and transport behind the front.

Outcome
The state can absorb an attack and regain the initiative.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - The Making of Soviet Strategy

Practice 23: Coordinate coalition goals before major operations

Problem
Allies waste strength when national priorities pull operations in different directions.

Action
Agree on the main objective and divide responsibilities before committing forces.

Outcome
Coalition resources support a common campaign.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945

Practice 24: Build Pacific strategy around distance and logistics

Problem
Ocean distances can isolate forces faster than combat can destroy them.

Action
Secure bases, shipping, air cover, and supply routes before advancing.

Outcome
Forces can sustain operations across the Pacific.

Chapter: From the First to the Second World War - American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War

Practice 25: Make deterrent threats credible and controlled

Problem
A nuclear threat fails when an opponent doubts either the ability or the will to carry it out.

Action
Link survivable forces and clear signals to limited political objectives.

Outcome
Opponents have stronger reasons to avoid escalation.

Chapter: Since 1945 - The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists

Practice 26: Plan conventional defense under nuclear limits

Problem
Conventional fighting can trigger nuclear escalation when leaders ignore thresholds.

Action
Design conventional options that resist aggression while preserving control over escalation.

Outcome
The state gains usable defenses without making nuclear war automatic.

Chapter: Since 1945 - Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age

Practice 27: Compete for political support before seeking military control

Problem
Revolutionary movements survive when the population sees the government as weak or unjust.

Action
Protect civilians and address local grievances while isolating armed organizers.

Outcome
Revolutionary forces lose recruits, information, and freedom of action.

Chapter: Since 1945 - Revolutionary War

Practice 28: Keep strategy flexible under uncertainty

Problem
Fixed plans fail when technology, politics, and opponents change unexpectedly.

Action
Review assumptions often and adjust means while keeping the political purpose clear.

Outcome
Strategy remains useful as conditions change.

Chapter: Since 1945 - Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future